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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in reversing the 
judgment of the trial court which ruled the six acres which the 
respondents purchased at the 1969 tax sale was not located in 
Davis County. 
2. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in reversing the 
judgment of the trial court which held that a dispute existed in 
1893 as to where the county boundary was between Davis and Weber 
County in the area of the disputed six acres. 
3. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in reversing the 
judgment of the trial court which held that Section 86.2 of the 
compiled Laws of Utah (1893) (Utah Code Ann. S 17-1-33 (1953)) 
allowed Davis and Weber Counties to resolve a dispute or 
uncertainty regarding a boundary between two counties. 
4. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in reversing the 
judgment of the trial court which held that the location of the 
main channel of the Weber River, which was the boundary between 
Davis and Weber Counties, could not be located in 1893. 
5. Did the Court of Appeals acting sua sponte, abuse 
its discretion in ruling that the issue of whether Davis County 
conducted the 1969 tax sale properly could not be tried. 
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the decision 
rendered by Judge Ronald Hyde after a full presentation of the 
evidence by both sides. The full opinion of the Utah Court of 
Appeals is found at page A-l of the appendix. A copy of the 
order denying rehearing is contained on page A-2 of the appendix. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals entered a decision in this 
matter on November 9, 1989. The Utah Court of Appeals entered 
its Order denying rehearing on December 20, 1989. Section 78-2-
2(3) of the Utah Code (1989) confers jurisdiction on the Utah 
Supreme Court to review Court of Appeals' decisions by a Writ of 
Certiorari. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS 
Pertinent provisions in this case come from the 
compiled Laws of Utah 1888 Section 86.2, Section 17-1-3 Utah Code 
Ann. (1953), Section 17-1-9, 17-1-32 and 17-1-33 Utah Code Ann., 
1953), the full texts are included either in the body of the 
petition or in Appendix A-3. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was bench tried before Judge Ronald Hyde 
sitting in the district court of Weber County on August 26, 1986. 
The Weber District Court ruled after a full evidentiary trial 
that the tax sale conducted by Davis County in 1969 under which 
the respondents acquired title to the six acres in question was 
invalid. The trial court concluded the tax sale was invalid 
because the six acres in question was not located in Davis 
County. 
The trial court specifically found that an exact 
location of the main channel of the Weber River (which was the 
boundary between Davis and Weber Counties) could not be 
determined prior to 1893. All of the evidence presented by both 
parties proved the Weber River prior to 1893 was subject to 
change. That in 1893 a definite uncertainty existed as to the 
location of the main channel of the Weber River and the boundary 
between Davis and Weber Counties. That Weber and Davis Counties 
acted pursuant to the provisions of Section 86*2 of the compiled 
laws of 1888 (same as Section 17-1-33, Utah Code Ann. (1953)). 
That Davis and Weber Counties jointly determined that 
an uncertainty existed in 1893 as to the main channel of the 
Weber River (which was the boundary between Davis and Weber 
Counties, see Sections 17-1-3, 17-1-9 and 17-1-32 which are set 
forth in appendix A-3. The two counties jointly resolved that a 
survey of the main channel of the Weber River should be made. 
Based upon the 1893 survey, Davis and Weber Counties accepted in 
1894 the prior survey. The 1894 survey put the main channel of 
the Weber in its present location which was substantially south 
of the six acres in question. The trial court concluded the six 
acres in question was located in Weber County so the tax sale 
conducted by Davis County in 1969 was invalid and of no effect 
whatsoever. The trial court concluded that since the petitioner 
UDOT had previously acquired the six acres in question by deed in 
1964 from the recorded owners, that the petitioner UDOT is the 
recorded owner of the six acres. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial 
court on November 9, 1989. The Utah Court of Appeals denied the 
petitioner UDOT, Weber and Davis Counties petition for re-hearing 
on December 20, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
In May of 1964 the petitioner UDOT purchased 24.41 
acres from the recorded owner Robert Dansie (now deceased). The 
24 acres were located near Uintah Junction where the Weber River 
intersects with U.S. Highway 89. The deed in question listed a 
portion of the property south of the existing Weber River as 
lying in Davis County and designated the property lying north of 
the Weber River as lying in Weber County. The deed was recorded 
on June 17, 1964 in Davis County. Through a mistake Davis County 
continued to assess 18 of the 24 acres. Davis County because the 
taxes on the 18 acres were not paid for 3 years, sold the 
property at its 1969 tax sale. The parties who purchased it at 
the 1969 tax sale were Messrs. Baxter (current respondent), 
Thomas Holberg and Ronald Toone. After the tax sale each of the 
three above-named individuals were each deeded six of the 
eighteen acres sold. Holberg was joined in the present action 
and allowed default judgment to be entered against him. Toone's 
interest was terminated in the case of Toone v. LeGrande Johnson 
Construction Co., Civil N. 10915, Davis County. 
The present respondent Baxter then commenced a quiet 
title action in May 1979 against the petitioner UDOT Weber and 
Davis Counties. A bench trial was held before Judge Ronald Hyde 
who found that the tax sale under which the respondent Baxter 
acquired the title was invalid. The decision of the trial court 
is found in appendix A-4. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT APPEARS THE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A 
DECISION TO REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT AND QUIET 
TITLE IN THE RESPONDENT'S BAXTER AND THEN 
PROCEEDED TO IGNORE WHATEVER FACTS IN THE 
RECORD THAT WERE TO THE CONTRARY. 
The petitioner UDOT, Weber and Davis Counties on page 
two of their brief indicated in the last paragraph that "...[t]he 
Lower Court bifurcated the trial of the issues in this case. It 
was determined to first try the issue of whether the property was 
located in Weber County. If the respondents Baxters lost on this 
issuef which they did, there was no reason to then try the issue 
of whether the petitioner Davis County conducted the tax sale 
property." A reading of the respondent Baxters's brief does not 
indicate any objection with this statement. This Court sua 
sponte in its footnote 2 on page 4 found because this Court could 
not find a ruling on the bifurcation issue in any order which it 
could find, ruled an abandonment of this defense on the part of 
the petitioners. 
The Utah Court of Appeals referred on many occasions in 
its decision to the trial of the earlier case of Toone v, 
LeGrande Johnson Construction Co.f Civil No. 29015 (Davis 
District Court). The Toone and Baxter cases involved the exact 
same issues, but only between different parties. The respondent 
Baxters specifically referred to the trial of the Toone case and 
indicated the issues were bifurcated and attached a copy of the 
pretrial Order. From the foregoing it was always assumed by the 
parties that the present action would also be bifurcated. It 
would be a total exercise in futility to try the issue of whether 
the tax sale was conducted properly by the petitioner Davis 
County if the subject property was found to not be located in 
Davis County. Finally, on page 16 of the proceedings before 
Judge Roth on August 4, 1986, the attorney for petitioner UDOT 
make specific reference to the bifurcation of the issues in this 
case by talking about what issues are to be tried in the first 
trial. 
Finally, the Respondent Baxter never disputed the 
statement contained in the petitioner's brief that in fact the 
issues in this case have been bifurcated. It can only constitute 
a sheer abuse of discretion and a definite prejudice against the 
petitioners for the Utah Court of Appeals to conclude that the 
petitioner Utah Department of Transportation abandoned its 
defense of whether the tax sale by the petitioner Davis County 
was conducted properly. 
The petitioners cite the case of UDOT v. Glen E. 
Fuller, 603 P.2d 814 (1979). In this case the defendant who was 
acting pro se attempted to introduce evidence before the Supreme 
Court which had not been argued in the Lower Court. The Supreme 
Court would not allow the Defendants to argue for the first time 
evidence which was being heard for the first time on the appeal. 
By this reasoning it would be totally improper for the Appellate 
Court to now consider and rule on evidence which was not raised 
or controverted by the respondents Baxters. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS WRONGLY CONCLUDED 
THAT A QUIET TITLE ACTION IN 1946 FOUND THE 
SIX ACRES IN QUESTION TO BELONG IN DAVIS 
COUNTY. 
It appears that whenever an Appellate Court becomes so 
result oriented, it proceeds to bootstrap its decision with 
erroneous and wrong conclusions which are not supported by the 
record. 
On page 2 of the Appellate Court's decision, it reads 
as follows: 
In March, 1946, title to the 18 acres tract 
near the border separating Davis and Weber 
Counties was quieted in Tasma Dansie in a 
decree that contained a legal description of 
the tract and characterized it as lying in 
Davis County. 
The petitioner UDOT prepared an Exhibit "C" which is 
located between pages 432 and 433 of the record which depicts and 
shows the 1946 quiet title action. The decree described the 
property which it found to be Weber County. This property is 
identified in yellow. The decree also described certain property 
as being located in Davis County. This property was identified 
in red on the Exhibit. The subject six acres is depicted in 
blue. The 1946 decree shows the subject six acres as being 
located in both counties and the respondents Baxters never 
questioned the foregoing in their brief. (Appendix A-5.) For 
the Court of Appeals to conclude facts to the contrary 
constitutes a clear usurpation and abuse of its discretion. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLATE COURT IN ITS RESULT ORIENTED 
DECISION FOUND IT NECESSARY TO GO OUTSIDE THE 
RECORD TO BOOTSTRAP ITSELF IN FINDING A BASIS 
TO REVERSE THE LOWER COURT. 
The Court of Appeals on page 7 of its decision relied 
on some laws and ordinances of the State of Deseret 1850-51 which 
it had found on file at the L.D.S. Church Historian's Office. A 
clear reading of the record and transcripts on file in this case 
indicate that none of the foregoing was presented by either party 
in the trial below. Clearly the foregoing deprives the parties 
from having a fair trial on the issues in the case. If indeed 
some additional information was found in the historical office of 
the L.D.S. Church, the case should be remanded to the trial court 
for further consideration. 
The reasoning of the Appellate Court is clearly 
erroneous and prejudicial to conclude that a clear definite main 
channel of the Weber River existed in any of the years 1850, 
1855/ 1866, or 1886. The boundary between the two counties was 
the main channel Weber River, but where was the main channel 
located. It is impossible from the record for either the 
Appellate Court or the Trial Court to come up with a metes and 
bounds legal description of where the main channel of Weber River 
was in the location of the subject property in the years referred 
to above. 
The survey notes shown in petitioners Exhibits 14, 15 
and 16 were only surveyed along the section lines. There is 
absolutely no legal metes and bounds description of the main 
channel of the Weber River and this is especially true in the 
This Utah Court of Appeals, though it was not present 
to hear the evidence and see the demeanor of the witnesses, 
concluded the trial court was wrong when it ruled that a 
controversy did not exist at all times prior to 1893 as to the 
location of the main channel of the Weber River so as to allow 
Davis and Weber Counties to invoke the provisions of the 1888 
compiled Laws of Utah S 86 which reads as follows: 
Whenever any dispute or uncertainty shall 
arise as to any county boundary, the same may 
be determined by the county surveyors of the 
counties interested, and in case they fail to 
agree, or otherwise fail to establish the 
boundary, the county courts of either or both 
counties interested, may engage the service 
of the aforesaid Territorial Commissioner, 
who, with the said county surveyors, or 
either of them, if but one appear for the 
purpose, shall proceed forthwith to 
permanently determine such boundary line at 
the expense of the counties interested by 
making the necessary surveys and erecting 
suitable monuments to designate said 
boundaries, which shall be deemed permanent 
until superseded by legislative enactment. 
Nothing in this act shall be construed to 
give the surveyors, mentioned herein, any 
further authority than to erect suitable 
monuments to designate said boundaries as 
they are now established by law. 
(Same as the current Section 17-1-33, Utah Code Ann. (1953).) 
Clearly the record and transcripts in this case reveal 
this case was to be decisive of the boundary between Davis and 
Weber Counties. 
Exhibits "C,M HH" and MEH attached to the petitioners' 
original brief clearly show that a dispute existed between Davis 
and Weber Counties as to the location of the main channel of the 
Weber River in the years prior to 1893. Weber and Davis Counties 
were not trying to establish a boundary other than the location 
of the main channel of the Weber River, but where was the main 
channel located. 
CONCLUSION 
The reversal by the Court of Appeals is totally 
contrary to the evidence presented, it can only be assumed that 
something was presented to the Court of Appeals that created some 
kind of bias or prejudice against the petitioners in this case. 
The foregoing manifested itself in the result oriented decision 
rendered in this case. There is absolutely nothing in the record 
in this case for the Court of Appeals to conclude that a metes 
and bounds description existed of the location of the main 
channel of the Weber River prior to 1894. That a controversy 
existed as to the location of the main channel of the Weber River 
in 1893 so to cause the two petitioner counties to have concern 
where the boundary between their two counties was located. 
The foregoing further manifests itself in the refusal 
of the Court of Appeals to allow the petitioner Utah Department 
of Transportation to litigate the issue of whether the tax sale 
was conducted properly by Davis County. 
It is abundantly clear the Court of Appeals exceeded 
its discretion and went outside the issues raised on appeal and 
the arguments and evidence presented in order to arrive at its 
decision of reversal and refusal to allow the petitioner Utah 
Department of Transportation to try the issues raised in its 
answer. 
The Court of Appeals was very shortsighted because by 
this ruling it does total violence to the location of the current 
boundary between Weber and Davis Counties. Instead of helping to 
permanently locate the boundary between Weber and Davis Counties, 
this decision will create utter chaos. 
The decision of the Appellate Court to reverse the 
decision of the Trial Court will not put this case to rest, but 
only serve to increase future litigation and appeals and create 
confusion as to where the boundary is between Davis and Weber 
Counties. 
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Case No. 890175-CA 
Second District, Weber County 
The Honorable Ronald O. Hyde 
Attorneys: Glen E. Fuller, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Stephen C. Ward, Salt Lake 
City, for Respondent Utah Department of 
Transportation 
Gerald E. Hess, Farmington, for Davis County 
Brent E. Johns, Ogden, for Weber County 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Ronald L. Baxter and Shirley Diane Baxter (the Baxters) 
appeal from a judgment quieting title to six acres of land in the 
Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT). We reverse. 
This dispute arises out of the territorial General 
Assembly's use of the center of the channel of the Weber River as 
part of the southern border of Weber County and the northern 
border of Davis County, in combination with two facts. First, 
until at least 1886, the river moved through more than one 
channel in the vicinity of the property now claimed, by the 
parties. Second, the channel of the Weber River now lies to the 
south of the disputed property, but did not follow its present 
course in years prior to 1894. 
At the outset, we note that this is not an action between 
counties seeking a judicial declaration of where their common 
boundary lies on the ground at all points. Hor is this a lawsuit 
between riparian owners on either side of a boundary river in 
which each claims title to formerly- submerged land that has 
surfaced because of a shift in the course of the river. This is 
a quiet title action to six acres of land in which defendant 
attacked plaintiffs' record title by challenging the title of 
plaintiffs' tax deed grantor, Davis County, based on an 
allegation that the property lies in Weber County. The issues 
presented on appeal are: (1) when and where was the boundary 
between Davis and Weber Counties fixed and established; (2) were 
the subject six acres north (i.e., in Weber County) or south 
(i.e., in Davis County) of that fixed boundary at that time; and, 
if south, (3) was the location of the boundary thereafter moved 
to the actual location of the Weber River in 1894 (i.e., to the 
south of the subject six acres, thereby placing the six acres in 
Weber County) either (a) by subsequent legislative enactment, (b) 
by county action authorized by the legislature, or (c) by the 
river's gradual and imperceptible movement there. 
We begin our analysis of these issues with a full 
presentation of the history of this litigation and of the 
parties' competing claims to ownership. In March 1946, title to 
an 18-acre tract near the border separating Davis and Weber 
Counties was quieted in Tasma Dansie in a decree that contained a 
legal description of the tract and characterized it as lying in 
Davis County. The tract was conveyed by Tasma Dansie in March 
1961 to Robert and Marie Dansie by way of a warranty deed 
containing the following property description: "S 1/2 of N 1/2 
of SW 1/4 of Sec. 25, 5 N., 1 W. SLM, Cont. 18.00 Acres in Davis 
County." Tax sale proceedings were eventually initiated by Davis 
County because of unpaid 1964 propertv tan»« 1 » A n . i * » . *. 
and two others acquired the 18-ac?e t L c t 11 t en?S£ ? » ? J S ! ! 
under a tax deed from Davis County tha? wal e^IS?^"iS"S^ , D2S 
1969. The following year, the t eLSt" in"ommSrevtn!v 7 * 6 ' 
part i t ioned the tract by reciprocal qui t e la imdeedl and th* 
^ s t e n t ^ t r ^ . a C 9 U i r e d ^ S U *™ t h a t ^ r ^ ' s S j e ^ o f 
In the meantime, however, the Dansies had conveyed the 
on May.?4 » E . The l f - , c « K K * & 5 w W c S " ^ ^ ^ 
i s sue in this case came) was described in th* A*2A »ZA2-°™S a t 
heading -IN WEBER COUNTY - The S ^ p £ p ^ d 5 ^ % * , ' S D O r 
» D A v y 8 ^ " 1 * 7 * " * W a S d e s c r i b e * unde / the h e T a ^ 0 - } ^ 
After a 1978 judgment dismissing a damage action bv »»*«..*... 
former cotenant for injury to his separate s i l -Jcre Sa%«? S 
discussed below, the Baxters f i l ed th i s quiet t i t i l S c t i o i ' i n 
1979, basing their claim to t i t l e on the 1969 tax deed f ? L J L H . 
County. UDOT f i l ed an answer, attached i t s w a « L t v ^ J ^ ™ £ X S 
the Dansies, and asked the court to -rule thl? It- L d e e d * r o m 
question i s located within tSe boundaSel of WeSr 2 2 2 2 ^ 3 . 
quiet t i t l e in i t s name. UDOT alleged that tht tl^S *K a n d t o 
Davis County was void and • • • • r S d t S t ^ S j B « t e « d f f j ? " 
thereby acquire ownership of the property? 2 t S h J J i . ^ r -*• 
claim, UDOT alleged that, because the property i s IMIIZA il " 
Weber County, Davis County had no authority tl Jax S l ' p l o p e r t y 
1. At the time of the sa l e of the Dansies* propertv for »™»4* 
taxes and the tax deed from Davis County? t a i M i r L f ^ J f ? ™ . 
were governed by Utah Code Ann. SS 59-10I26 to It / fSSff'J1 1 9 8 
see Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-1325 to -1364 7 l 9 8 7 ? r At till i?°W 
sec t ion 59-10-64(5) authorised tne coSnty auditor to exScute^' 
tax deed conveying fee simple t i t l e to the purchaser t i t tax 
s a l e . Once executed and delivered by the auditor Jhl « ? • £ £ 
made tax deeds -prima fac ie e v i d e n c e d 1 pJoceediSls 
subsequent to the preliminary sa le [to the countvl In* «f I-K. 
conveyance of the property i J the graStee i S ^ s i o p l e - it 
III)?'5-3 U 9 8 7 > ; ™*r'*»™V™rin,r,°«$ S £ £ ? - < o u h 
to acquire title when taxes were unpaid, or to convey title 
through a tax deed.2 UDOT also pleaded collateral estoppel 
based on a 1978 judgment dismissing a damage action by Ronald 
Baxter's former cotenant, Toone, against the contractor UDOT 
permitted to remove gravel from the property adjoining the 
Baxters'. 
In February 1983, the trial court granted UDOT summary 
judgment on the collateral estoppel defense. Because Toone was 
determined not to be the owner of the adjacent property in the 
1978 judgment—based on a jury's determination that it lies 
2. As an alternative defense, UDOT also pleaded that the 1969 
tax deed from Davis County was invalid because statutory tax sale 
procedures were not followed. In its brief, UDOT 
mentioned—without citing us to the record—that trial of its two 
defenses was "bifurcated" by the trial court, with the separate 
trial on the alleged tax sjLlft invalidity to be heard only if UDOT 
failed to establish the tax fleefl invalidity at the first trial by 
proving its allegation that the six acres lie within the 
boundaries of Weber County. Our independent scrutiny of the 
record before us in this ten-year-old action has unearthed no 
oral or written motion for such a bifurcation, see Utah R. Civ. 
P. 7(b)(1), a request presumably governed by Utah R. Civ. P. 
42(b), and no order of the court granting such a request. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2). The issue of the validity of the tax 
sale proceedings that led to the 1969 tax deed was not raised by 
anyone at the pretrial hearing or explicitly preserved in a 
pretrial order in this case for later resolution. Indeed, there 
is no mention of this defense in the record before this court 
other than in UDOT's pleading, in light of these circumstances, 
UDOT must be deemed to have abandoned this alternative defense, 
and it is not entitled to another trial on this alternate theory 
if the judgment appealed from here, which is based on the 
purported location of the subject six acres within Weber County, 
cannot withstand appellate review. 
within the boundaries of Weber County3~the trial court 
concluded that Baxter could not relitigate that i.sue. On 
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that application of t*L 
collateral estoppel doctrine to the Baxter^JuUt ?i?leAction 
was erroneous. Summary judgment in UDOT's favor was reversed 
and the case was remanded, fiaxterv^otah Den"t «J %£.I!I 4A* 
P.2d 1167 (Utah 1985). Yl m™ ™P f ftf TrWBP,, 705 
At the bench trial in August 1986, the Baxter* rnnfon<t^ 
that the location of the boundary l i n e ' b e t w e e n t £ % o S f w a s 
set by the actual location of the Weber River's main channel " 
the time of the legislature's initial description of the 
boundary, which they believed was on January 10. 1866 At th.t 
time, they asserted, the Weber River was noTth of the 'subject tix 
acres, putting them in Davis County. They cUimed that til 
boundary's location has remained fixed in that spot since there 
is no subsequent indication of legislative intenfto m £ e it Horn 
there. Furthermore, they argued, the counties themselves had no 
authority to move their common boundary from the legislltively 
fixed location by thereafter agreeing to accept the surveyed 
location of the main channel of the river in 1894, to the south 
of the subject six acres, as their boundary. 
UDOT, on the other hand, contended that there was 
-uncertainty" about where the Weber/Davis County boundary line 
was prior to 1894 because the river moved around before then and 
because the excerpted survey notes in evidence did^St contain a 
metes and bounds description of the Weber River's location on the 
ground through Section 25 before 1894. This uncertainty was 
resolved, UDOT claimed, when the Weber and D a v ^ G o u ^ y surveyors 
surveyed a line down the middle of the channel of the WeSr liver 
in 1894, when the river was concededly running to the south of the 
3 . I t was not until after this 1978 judgment, in ToonTv 
LeCrande Johnson Constr, Co,, Civ. NO. 20915 (Second District 
Court, Davis County), that Davis County stopped assessing the six 
acres claimed by the Baxters and tendered them a rebate of some 
property taxes previously paid to it. At the loans trial, the 
parties were apparently unaware of the 1866 statute setting firth 
the description of the county lines, discussed in section I of 
this opinion, infxj They stipulated that the location of the 
Weber River upon statehood on January 4, 1896, marked the 
boundary between Davis and Weber Counties. The jurors were, 
therefore, asked to decide whether Toone's six acres were l4r»t^ 
tLfd1teC o u n t y *reference to the «i~V2t5iTcS5oJ0S;tS 
property now claimed by the Baxters. Furthermore, because the 
counties adopted the 1894 surveyed location of the river as 
their common boundary line, that was the county boundary 
thereafter adopted by the state constitution. This action by 
the counties was authorized, UDOT argued, by the following 
territorial act, adopted February 20, 1878: 
Whenever any dispute or uncertainty 
shall arise as to any county boundary, the 
sane may be determined by the county 
surveyors of the counties interested, and 
in case they fail to agree, or otherwise 
fail to establish the boundary, the county 
courts of either or both counties 
interested, may engage the service of the 
aforesaid Territorial Commissioner, who, 
with the said county surveyors, or either 
of them, if but one appear for that 
purpose, shall proceed forthwith to 
permanently determine such boundary line 
at the expense of the counties interested 
by making the necessary surveys and 
erecting suitable monuments to designate 
said boundaries, which shall be deemed 
permanent until superseded by legislative 
enactment. Nothing in this act-shall be 
construed to give the surveyors, mentioned 
herein, any further authority than to 
erect suitable monuments to designate said 
^boundaries as they are now established by 
law. 
1888 Compiled Laws of Utah § 86 (now see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-1-33 (1987)). 
At the conclusion of trial, the court found that "the exact 
location of the Weber River in 1866 cannot be determined," 
apparently because the evidence contained no description of its 
course through Section 25 at that time along a surveyed line. 
Although the trial court agreed with the Baxters that the 
boundary had been legislatively established by the description 
given in the 1866 enactment, it otherwise embraced UDOT's legal 
analysis. The court concluded that the counties had, in 1894, 
properly exercised the authority given them in section 86 of 
the 1888 Compiled Laws to resolve the boundary uncertainty and 
to fix their common boundary as the survived IAQJ IA~.«.I 
the center of the channel of the Weber *?J!r 2i location of 
to the trial court, the subject si l aer~ ??« JS^l' ac?ordi*9 
been in Weber county,- redwing the ?« de*5 J™,^8 f1Wi7S 
^
l i d
- , 11?* t 0 fc?e si* a c ™ "« S c o r X f y ^ t e d 5 S U D t y UDOT, and this appeal ensued. ^ * 7 suietea in 
Z. 
We address first the question of the legislature's 
establishment of the boundary between Davit £*»»!*• . 5 « ^ 
County. The fixing of a c c ^ t T S S t a J i ! STSSi .St iS 1 *' 
prerogative, San J»»n r^tv v"
 nrfl°S ffnntT ianJiFJJV., 371 P.2d 855 ,^(1962) , IT is the prescription Sf J 2 J 2 ' 
for resolving any uncertainty about the actual l f i r , f ? ^ 5 Jv . boundary on the ground. Barton v SanLJf S i« l o c a *i o n o f that 
162 P. 611, 612 (1916). " •• P»nPfttft County, 49 Utah 188, 
b e l i e T t K s ^ 
were first established 1» t l i ' t S S t S r t ^ f S S r W S i 
Our research has revealed that Weber County? one of ?he fill I' 
six counties of what is now Utah was rr..*li f l J. f i r s t 
January 15, 1850, act of ?he toiSruFSJSrSl E S S ? * ° f a 
Laws and Ordinance .f
 t h f sttt¥ek If^*;**™*** £?S e m"y: , 
on file> at ChurchHiitorlan'i offiL ^ S e h n i 0 ; ! ! <°"9inals 
Latter-Day Saints, Salt Lake City, uiah) (?ex?
 efn?S ? r i S t 0 f 
originals and printed in 8 OtthTu.Srtal ^ l W M l M o f T 
Davis county was not created until an act of October 5 la so 
Id. (text copied from originals and printed in 8 mlh 
Historical Q. 190). We need not set forth r£2< I ¥ 1 \ * 
originally described in these ^ L S L S T L S E j ^ n * ? ^ 6 8 ^ 8 
segment of their common boundary at issue iS this i? . i 8 5 5 ' t h e 
moved by the territorial l e g i s l a t e it H ^ J S ^ K 
expression of legislative intent, a January lT^S?*5!^----? . 
took -all that portion of Weber county SSuTh of I ??' e n a c t m e n t 
down the centre of the main channel of til Sebtr r i~r 't™™9 
point due north of the north-west corLr «f 5KLJ ? r ' - t o a 
thence due west to the Grea? S i t till' and 5 K £ S V ? " ' 
Davis County 1855 Territorial LawTof UUh? c^ LIUS I 2 
LTcllltl]" °£ h a n d w r i t t e n ori9inal on file at S a h ^ e S 2 Archives) 
b o u n £ r y % f ^ b e ^ 
property at issue in this case, by describing iI »« » ?• * 
the center of the main channel of t £ S b S River Itl™ d 0 W n 
i C i E ^ / I S ^ *!«estaJlis»ing ^counties- glogrJpMcal limits was not contingent on any survey of the Sii S M S I - , 
location on the ground at that time, it is sufficient that the 
county boundary was described in 1855 with enough certainty 
that it could have been definitely located on the ground at the 
^ ? 6 °Lthl ena?25nJ: *** Ba^Qn v. Banned Cn„n?T. U 2 p. aJ 
613. The described line is one down the center of the 
nonnavigable river's -main channel," which is the bed of the 
river over which the principal volume of water flowed. Black's 
Law Dictionary 210 (5th ed. 1979). m the context of county^ 
boundary definition, where permanence is desirable, the "centre 
of the main channel" provides a definitely locatable boundary 
since the riverbed itself has permanent features that are 
observable even if water does not flow in it year-round and 
even if the river subsequently changes course and follows a 
different channel. 
We therefore conclude as a matter of law that the common 
boundary between Davis and Weber Counties was established by 
the territorial legislature in January 1855 as the location of 
the center of the main channel of the Weber River at that 
time. The trial court erred insofar as it used the 1866 
enactment and the 1866 location of the river's main channel as 
the relevant temporal and topographical reference points. 
II. 
We move next *o the question of the location of the six 
acres claimed by the Baxters in relation to the main channel of 
the Weber River in 1855. It is clear from the evidence 
presented at trial, including the expert testimony introduced 
by UDOT, that the river moved and took different paths through 
the southwest quarter of Section 25 before 1894. A United 
States Government Land Office survey of that area was conducted 
in October 1855, and a map (Exhibit D-14) was drawn based on 
the field notes. The following notation appears on the face of 
the map: 
This map of Township Ho. 5 north of 
Range No. 1 West of Salt Lake Meridian is 
strictly conformable to the field notes of 
the survey thereof on file in this office 
which have been examined and approved. 
/s/ David H. Burr 
Surveyor General of Utah 
The total number of acres surveved « w ™ ^ « *... 
17,032.28. The map depicts the loe a??^J\v h e ***' *aa 
of the Weber River as it traverses ?hi L?f th! wide8t chann«l 
including Section 25, as well 11 I « e entlre township, 
the area9of the subjec? nit ac"s SotSM! C O n? a r y channel ^ 
north of the property cl"meS S ihe SmSrJ? 0 6 1' r U° t0 the 
26, a V a T ' V l & i ' ^ *T to S « C " - 8 25, 
prepared another Sap (Exhibit D-16) s ? r T ^ ?en!ra1*8 office 
survey field notes, excerpts of which llrtl conformable to the 
trial. The 1871 map depict J * L ?iS»^ere intr°auced at 
it traverses Sections 25 an? 26 tram ~«? ?£ the Weber R i * « «* 
shows three river channel* in th! nSr?J«L J° J'6^ * The detail 
southwest quarter of Section 25 thS2^n?f« q u a df a n t of the 
S J ^ e M h a n n e l S ™ - - e - ^ o r ^ ^ 
- r v e y ^ w ^ ^ 
the north, all located in Township 5 H«ri-S
 B °
t h e r
,
s e c t i o n s t o 
map prepared from that survey^(Exhibif £ ?^Range X W e s t - A 
River's course through Sections 25 ™* ?«15J f£OWS t h e W e b e r 
detail shows three river IhiSSelsrf^-26 !* t h a t t i m e - 4 The 
subject six acres? [n virtuaUv ?he "SET*,*0 S* n o r t h o f t h e 
1871 map. Both the 1871 and the ? L ^ . l 0 C a ^ ° n a s o n t h e 
no water in the 26' wide setonSar^ c I L n n ^ o ^ 1 * n ?*V°™* 
survey, describing it as "old rivlr bid?" ° t h e 1 8 5 5 
cond^teS e i^Seas^ngyo? f iSt S T S 2 e h ^ "S^X * i w »as 
County C0ranissione?s, l£J$?J2L2S ultlttV£%*¥' 
di . t f f i tVSX S x ^ n o t * ^ trial, the 
General maps (Exhibits EI2, S i " and S i ^ S ! S u r v er° r 
counsel removed them from the eii^JSL *££ because UDOT's 
from the record in this Sending an»f°?m* MhMI t h e i r absence 
the Utah Supreme CoEt . S S S S ?hl I h ^ 6 ^ ^ 1 1 ? n ° t e d ' 
a determination of whether ?h« «.»«« ? to. ?ne t r i a l co«rt for 
at trial. On remand, thl tr ia l c o S r ^ T / ^ " ^ a s ^idence 
that the missing maps were receivS L*!^JK* i n J u n e " « 
UDOT's counsel Still d W ^ o t ^ l l S r t h S ^ ^ S ' *?w?ver' 
for inclusion in the record on am£fi .?? t0^he t r i a l c o u r t 
Instead, counsel inexpIi2ISwnr2tSinL It? **•* » « " * . 
and did not relinquish Jn^mto Ss ^ i ' d S l ^ E ' J ! e x M £ i t S 
this court after oral argument. Greeted to do so by 
channel) was indisputably runnin9 east-west to tha «m,fh „* ..K. 
subject six acres. nonetheless" the c?ear weijnt " t n e ' 
S i S - 5 ^ h nn 1 ^f ' n e ' w e S r ^ e f in^lsS? . £ ? ' "It 
until at least 1886;* thus. t n ^ e ' w i t n j n " ^ SLSZu?*' 
III. 
We next consider whether the physical location of the 
relevant county boundary was moved after 1855. Once the 
legislature established the geographical limits of Davis and 
Weber Counties in January of that year, their common boundary 
remained in the actual location of the center of the main 
channel of the Weber River at that time unless and until 
changed to a different location on the ground in accordance 
S ? S % 2 2d af? f i l * ? ^ V S^HLlllUhfr-ro , 258 M a . 
Henderson, 64 Ohio 83, H O N.E.2d 817, 820 (1952); SS& AifiO. 
Barton v. Sanpete County, 162 p. at 612. Between left and 
statehood, the territorial legislature frequently reshaped and 
redefined the boundaries of counties in the northern third of 
what is now Utah. £ss generally Allen, The gvr>inMnn off m , , ^ 
Boundaries in Utah, 23 Utah Historical Q. 261, 266-77 (19551 
However, there is noinjUee^oTTthat it intended to change the 
geographical limi|r-bTDavis and Weber Counties that it had 
established in 1855. 
The legislative description of the line separating Davis 
»?^re$ts«;C0U?^!n Ji? »ot substantively change in enactments 
after 1855. In an act of January 17, 1862, the same basic 
description of Davis County's northern boundary line, but from 
the opposite direction from that used in 1855, was set out: 
All that portion of territory bounded 
south by Great Salt Lake County, west by 
the Eastern shore of Great Salt Lake, 
5. Although the various experts disagreed over whether it was 
possible to determine from the excerpts of survey field notes 
which of the channels was the main channel in 1866, there was 
agreement that the maps and field notes did not show any river 
water flowing to the south of the subject six acres. 
north by a line running due East from a 
point in said shore to a point in the 
center of the channel of Weber River north 
from the northwest corner of Kingston's 
Fort, thence UP the center of said 
channelloJ to the center of the lower 
canyon of said river, and East by the 
summit of the Nasatch mountains, is hereby 
made and named Davis County. 
Acts. Resolutions and Memorials of the Territory of Utah 
1851-70 40 (emphasis added) (on file at Utah State Archives). 
Four years later, the relevant northern boundary line of Davis 
County was again described as 
a line running due east from a point on 
[the eastern shore of the Great Salt Lake] 
to a point in the centre of the channel of 
[the] Weber river due north from the 
northwest corner of Kingston's Fort, 
thence up the centre of said channel to a 
point opposite the summit of the Wasatch 
mountains. . . . 
1866 Territorial Laws of Utah, ch. CXLVI, S 14; 1876 Compiled 
Laws of Utah § 156. Weber County was simply described as being 
bordered on the south by Davis County. Id., S 15; 1876 
Compiled Laws of Utah § 157. 
In a February 1880 territorial enactment, apparently the 
last legislation on the subject prior to statehood, the 
6. In the absence of any legislative intent indicating 
otherwise, we construe the legislature's use of "the center of 
the channel" and "the center of said channel" in this and all 
subsequent enactments describing the relevant county boundary 
as meaning the center of the "main channel" of the river,, the 
phrase used in the 1855 enactment in apparent recognition of 
the fact that there was more than one river channel at some 
points. As the Weber County surveyor testified in this case, 
if a boundary line between counties is described as the center 
of the channel of a river, that means the center of the main 
channel of the river. Furthermore, it is standard practice 
within his profession for a person charged with the job of 
surveying the channel of a river to determine and follow the 
main channel if there is more than one. 
relevant northern boundary of Davis County was again described 
as a line due east from a described point on the east shore of 
Great Salt Lake to a point in the center of the channel of the 
Weber River due north from the northwest corner of Kingston's 
Fort, "thence up the center of said channel to a point opposite 
the summit of the Wasatch mountains. . . . " 1888 Compiled Laws 
of Utah § 65. The southern boundary of Weber County was again 
described as being Davis County. Id., § 66.7 
Utah's state constitution, adopted by the people in 
November 1895, went into effect on January 4, 1896, the day it 
was admitted into the Union. Article XI, § l provided: 
The several counties of the Territory 
of Utah, existing at the time of the 
adoption of this Constitution, are hereby 
recognized as legal subdivisions of this 
State, and the precincts and school 
districts now existing in said counties, 
as legal subdivisions thereof, and they 
shall so continue until changed by law in 
pursuance of this article. 
7. By describing the northern Davis County perimeter from the 
opposite direction, the wording but not the content of the 
first post-statehood act defining county boundaries varied from 
that found in some of the earlier enactments. The relevant 
northern Davis County boundary was still described as a line 
from a point where the Wasatch range summit line crossed the 
middle of the channel of the Weber River, "thence westerly down 
the middle of said channel to a point north of the northwest 
corner of Kingston's Fort. . . . " 1898 Rev. Stat, of Utah, 
title 12, ch. 1, S 464. The same description of the northern 
Davis County boundary appears in the current statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-1-9 (1987), and its predecessors since 1898. 
In the 1898 statutes, however, the legislature no longer 
described the relevant southern boundary of Weber County simply 
as Davis County; instead, it was specifically described as a 
line from a designated point on the east shore of Great Salt 
Lake, "thence east to the middle of the channel of Weber river; 
thence up the middle of said channel to a point where crossed 
by the summit line of the Wasatch range. . . . " 1898 Rev. 
Stat, of Utah, title 12, ch. 1, § 486. The same description 
appears in the current statute, Utah Code Ann. § 17-1-32 
(1987), and its predecessors since 1898. It is apparent: that 
the 1898 statute did not alter the southern Weber County 
boundary, but merely described it from the direction opposite 
that used in 1898 to describe the northern Davis County 
This constitutional provision was
 rftfu.. ^  * 
statute: "The several counties^* Hit It* <in ?wP°«t-statehood 
named and described are the counties 2 111 *? Jhis ch«Pter 
otherwise changed by law?- fSSJ Jf! L*? 6 8tate unt*l 
ch. 1, § 459 (now Sund at U t " C o ^ ' J ^ ?? ?tah' " " • "< 
The new constitution also provided th^i S JZ"1"3 <19«7)). 
moved from one county inSo'EothE w ^ L u ^ 0 * * COuld no* *» 
majority of the voters living in t h l t ^ ^ h e W r o v « l of a 
evidence presented at trial to even hii? ^!*-d??llB?ntllry 
intended to move the northern D^vis i S S ^ E She leai*lature 
actual location of the cent" rtlSJSSFJP***? from the 
^ V ^ " ^ ^ « 1 court 
their boundary pursuant to the author?*! Z* *??* tlme as 
86 of the 1888 Compiled Laws of Stah S«SiI^ ^ ^ action 
establish a disputed or unclr?fin £ u n £ £ " f U U above' to 
Davis" S S ^ ^ ^ S ^ ^ ^ ^ S ^ " ^ ^e 
or atlas of that county at ?hei? SetETSf1? C 0 T i s s i ^ a m 
It was to show public roads? scho??^«?^f*.A??ust 21' 18*3. 
lines, city and townsite lines inclSdfnn^^lines' Precinct 
Railroads, All Public S t r e s s ! ' S e c J l o t l ^ S o ^ ^ ' 
?awsWoeratr|r?rtaor?i^ i M i i J J S t &F™Vi WftfiSSd" 
the legislature's power to Sove lerJuoTJ^*18^ rest^cted 
another without voter approval? t e r r i t o ry from one county to 
the river's actual location in tlltl years " S T S * ^ ^ ^ to 
the evidence shows that, at those t W JK* 6w? l e a r weio*t of 
were still south of the riverchaime?t"jJhe subject six acres 
established boundaries of Davis CtoSntv *' Within tne 
map 
Government lot lines, and all Topographical data as shown by 
the records of the Surveyor General's Office. . . . " They 
approved a contract with draftsman E. A. Vail for this work on 
October 2, 1893. At the same meeting, the clerk was instructed 
to write to the Weber County Surveyor for "notes of the survey 
of the Weber River between Weber and Davis Counties." The 
minutes of a December 26, 1893, Board session documented a 
complaint by one Timothy Kendall that he had been assessed, and 
had paid, taxes on one piece of land by both Weber and Davis 
Counties. On January 15, 1894, the clerk reported to the Board 
that the Weber County surveyor had informed him he had no notes 
of a survey of the line between Davis and Weber Counties. He 
also verified that Timothy Kendall had been double taxed in 
some undetermined amount "on account of the County line not 
being properly located . . . ." According to a committee 
report, completion of Mr. Vail's map was awaiting notes of the 
Davis/Weber County line and surveys of two other segments of 
the Davis County perimeter, which the committee considered "a 
necessary adjunct to the map." The committee's recommmendation 
that surveys of these three lines be conducted so they could be 
properly located on Mr. Vail's map was approved on January 15, 
1894. 
There is no further mention of the county boundary until 
the minutes of the March 19, 1894, board meeting: 
The matter of permanently locating 
the County line between Davis and Weber 
Counties was referred to the Surveyor to 
confer with the authorities of Weber 
County with a view to permanently locating 
said line with power to call for such 
assistance as he may need in the matter. 
The board approved a $106 claim by the surveyor of the county 
line, T. H. Phillips (who was also the Davis County Clerk), on 
May 7, 1894, and ordered the survey notes recorded. There is 
no indication in these notes that the surveyors ever consulted 
the 1855, 1871, and 1886 field notes and maps from the 
Government Land Office and the Surveyor General or went out 
onto the land to determine the actual location of the river's 
main channel when the boundary was established by the 
legislature. The 1894 survey notes clearly show that Phillips 
and the Weber County Surveyor simply took the language of the 
legislature's description of the Davis and Weber County 
boundary in section 65 of the 1888 Compiled Laws of Utah and 
proceeded to survey a line from "a point in the center of the 
channel of the Weber river due north of the northwest corner «* 
Fort Kingston, thence east to the above naSeS poiE in ? £ °f 
center of the channel of the Weber River . . . thence « D L 
center of the channel of the Weber River to a Mint A».>*.4?Z 
the summit of the Wasatch mountains,- tie lattl? w i n H e l ™ 
80' north of the center of the river opposiJi tne'suSmi?? 9 
As we held in the earlier sections of this opinion the 
relevant boundary between Davis and Weber Sunties was' 
legislatively established by the January 10, 1855, enactment as 
the actual location of the center of thl main channel Sf^Se 
Weber River at that time, and that boundary was not 
subsequently moved by legislative enactment. The trial court 
apparently concluded that, in section 86 of the 1888 Comoiled 
Laws of Utah, the territorial legislature deletaJS .utSSrlS 
to Dayis and Weber Counties to disregard that unequivocal and 
certain 1855 expression of legislative intent and to, in 
effect, move their common boundary to a new location i * t-* 
the physical location of the rivel in 1894? This cSncluSion If 
law underlies the trial court's pivotal factual finding JhJt 
the 1894 survey -set the river definitely- and thatthl 
disputed six acres -is and has always been in Weber county.-
On appeal, this court may set aside findings of fact, in 
actions at equity or in law, only if they are clearlv 
?f,f0!!e?Sf;x R! l d„ v- Mu1~"al o f ftma>,<> Tnfi. fn,, 776 P.id 896 (Utah 1989); Barter y, rrnnrif?, 741 p.2d 548 (Utah ct ADD 
1987); fififi Utah R. Civ P. 52(a). A finding is cJeiriy PP* 
erroneous if it is without adequate evidentiary support or if 
it was induced by an erroneous view of the law! state v 
Halfcei, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). m detenilninf^hether 
a trial court's finding was thus induced, we givT™ defe^Scf 
to the trial court's view on issues of law. Xnslead, we review 
the trial court's legal conclusions, including its conslrucIiSn 
of a statute, under a correction-of-error standard iSr,,*! • 
Fashion centre, Ltd., 77i p.2d 1033, loss (Utah S i s ) " 1 1 1 
We disagree with the trial court's interpretation of the 
authority given to the counties by section 86. There is 
evidence of uncertainty in 1894 about where the boundary 
between Davis and Weber County was actually located on the 
2 J 2 5 . ? S J ° E « r f t ? al°nS th?i ^ ^ ^ that canno? be 
ascertained from the record evidence. However, although 
section 86 authorised the county surveyors to locate and mark 
county boundaries upon the ground in the event of uncertaintv 
or dispute, their statutory authority was express 1J lSited to 
the erection of suitable monuments -to designate said 
boundaries as they are now «««^hilgh«m t^ liW . 18ftft O M m 4 i i * 
Laws of Utah $86 (emphasis added]> 7 We interpret"f® 0wnplled 
limitation as a requirement that the surveyors look not 4.,.<- «-„ 
the legislature's words describing a countyline bu? h J K £ 
legislature's intent regarding tte .ctuaTlocatJon £ t e 
boundary as -established by law" in 1855. Because the 
surveyors in 1894 disregarded the actual location of the middle 
of the abandoned channel followed by the Weber Rivel wh®n £he 
counties' boundary was legislatively established IS 1855? thlir 
action was invalid as not in compliance with the strictures of 
section 86. Therefore, the Davis County CommiMiSnlrS' 
adoption of the surveyed location of the river in 1894 as the 
-permanent- boundary" (until superceded by legislative 
enactment) was of no force or effect in moving the northern 
^^17 ^ r 1 ^ 0 0 ! 1 1 ^ * 0 the location ©* the river channel 
in 1894. Thus, the trial court's findings that the 1894 survev 
:set the river definitely- and that the property a? iSsiie SeTJ 
-is and has always been in Weber county,- inasmuch as they are 
£ • %£U£ 2 p t t ^ £ U ^ S 1 e r r ? n e 0 U S interpretation of section 86, must be set aside as clearly erroneous. 
Finally, we consider whether the relevant intercountv 
boundary moved from the 1855 Weber River location to the 1894 
Weber River location by operation of the doctrine of 
accretion. Accretion is the slow and imperceptible deposit of 
alluvium or silt on one riverbank and erosion of the other 
10. Although the Weber County Surveyor and the Davis County 
Surveyor testified at trial that they regarded the 1894 survey 
as definitively designating the boundary between Weber and 
Davis County, that view was obviously not shared by Davis 
County itself, which had assessed the disputed property as 
being within its territorial limits from at least 1930 
resulting in Davis County's tax deed to Tasma Dansie in June 
1938. Furthermore, the Weber County Assessor was still 
complaining to Weber County Commissioners at a January 4 1904 
meeting about problems in making accurate assessments because ' 
the boundary line with Davis County was still unsettled. In a 
response, one of the commissioners wisely opined that the 
matter could only be resolved through remedial legislation, in 
any event, the counties' acquiescence in the 1894 river 
location as their boundary is immaterial in light of the 
certain and locatable description employed by the 1855 
legislature when it fixed %he boundary. See San Jimn r,»i»«-~ -
Grand County. 371 P.2d at 857. " ™n smmTY Yl 
bank that gradually changes the location of the river eh.««.i 
City of Lawrence
 Yl Mrfirftw# 211 Kan# 842, Jos p Id Sfo J??61* 
(1973). Simply put, the doctrine of accretion ntltll i>*l 
where a river forms a boundary between cSSntiSs J!S Sr«n!r^ 
owners, the movement of that boundary riv« ovlx UmS thtllln 
the erosion process works a change il the boundary ! S d 9 
therefore, in the ownership of exposed land S E J ^ L S T L 
the side of the riyer opposite t 5 ^ S ^ ^ \ f ~ 5 £ . ~ 
movement, See. Matthews
 Y. MCfiftf, 358 F.2d 516, 517 tilt e?r 
1966) (applying Arkansas law); City nf Ttfl1Trftnrr 5 i*S«L «A. 
)llJ*?k£s* ip# 1 ? 7 5 ) ; Tavis v- H*Ta1nn. 157 H.w.2d 7ia 72« 
(1918) (applying accretion doctrine M a matter of fedeJI!'ill 
to interstate boundary formed by navigable rim?- Ifftl I 
fiQlift, 71 Utah 91, 262 P. 987 (1927) ? i S « S JijSifr** 
applicability not raised by State's complaint setting out 
lakeshore landowner's claim of title to lake bottomiiLS L 
Sf^f^^Sf^^811 ^ e ) ; *»"***« Y, ftmn^n it 5?ah"ST37% 
250 (1894) (applying accretion doctrine as a matter of fed*;.! 
law to determine federal patent grantee's title tlnewlv 
surfaced Utah Lake bottomland), in contrast, where 1 lnfl,rv 
river suddenly abandons its channel and occupies a n e w ^ n e T 
because of natural or manmade forces, the doctrine does no? 
apply. Such a shift is said to be avulsive? and" U rtluTs in 
no movement of the county boundary or change in ownership I* 
the land avulsively transferred flom one Side ItTSTSSrto 
the o^er. Thomson Y. ClnrKf? TnrIL, 162 Colo. 506, 427 P?2d 
314, 317 (1967); City Of Lawronc* y. M ^ r n t 508 p # « 7 *•J° 
Witter v. County of fit, rhaxles., 528 s.wtfd at ui Mccafferiv 
y^Jteuna, 144 Mont. 385, 397 P.2d 96, 99 (1964); 01 sen y t Y 
toL££, 412 P.2d 162, 167 (Okla. 1966); Lfi Iriflisiri^ Tennessee, 248 u.s. at 173. 
Although we are aware of no Utah precedent applying the 
accretion doctrine as a matter of state law to the movement of 
intrastate county boundaries, the preliminary issue^Tus 
applicability was not contested, briefed, or ruled unon J« fha 
trial court. Nor has it been raised o T a p p L " ^he*?rU? 
court simply found that the Weber River's movement to itS 1894 
location was not avulsive. ««»««. to ics iuy4 
Assuming, aj^ uenflfi, that the doctrine of accretion is 
applicable and relevant to a determination of which cSuntv the 
subject six acres lie in, the trial court's findino ««?£?. 
P
° ^ ,
O U ? \ J 1 8 0 ^ 8et aside •• c l e " ^ erJoneSw?9 S e llUr 
weight of the evidence conclusively shows that~the WebSr 
River's movement to its 1894 location was no? the reSuU of 
accretion. The river was flowing east-west considerably to the 
north of the subject six acres as late as October 1886. By the 
time of the 1894 survey, fewer than eight years later, the 
river had moved its course entirely to the south of the subject 
property, which is itself over 400' wide measured from north to 
south. In the spring of 1894, the river crossed the western 
border of Section 25 at a point more than 1,500' south of where 
it had crossed that section line in the earlier Government Land 
Office surveys. We hold that this drastic shift in such a 
short time, whereby the river completely changed its course to 
a new channel due to natural or manmade conditions, constitutes 
avulsion as a matter of law. figs McCaffarHr
 v. Young. 397 P.2d 
at 100 (lateral migration of river's channel one-quarter mile 
in fewer than 100 years, "perceptible over the period of just 
one generation," would be avulsive even in the absence of clear 
evidence of a sudden flood). Accordingly, the location of the 
boundary between Davis and Weber Counties did not, by 
application of the doctrine of accretion, move with the river 
from the location of its old channel in 1855 to its location in 
1894 south of the property claimed by the Baxters. The 
disputed six acres is, therefore, within the fixed boundaries 
of Davis County. 
In light of UDOT's failure to establish that the disputed 
six acres is located within the boundaries of Weber County, 
which was the factual basis for its defense,11 the trial 
court erroneusly concluded that the 1969 tax deed from Davis 
County was invalid. We reverse the judgment below and remand 
11. 
Where a defendant in an action to quiet 
title claims to be the owner of the 
property and seeks to have title quieted 
in him, he has the burden of proving the 
allegations of his claim and, in effect, 
becomes a party plaintiff. 
Tflyjfi v. Hi gains. 157 R.W.2d at 724. fififi Gatrell v. Salt Lake 
County. 106 Utah 409, 149 P.2d 827 (1944) (once quiet title 
plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of ownership, defendant 
has the burden of going forward with proof of his challenge to 
plaintiff's title). 
this case to the district court for entry of a judgment 
quieting title to the property at issue in the Baxters?" 
Norman H. Jacksjfti, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
12. See note 2, supra. 
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DEC 201989 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF A P P E M . S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ , ^ ^ 
ooOoo ^ A* «Rk of * • Cocrt 1
 C#urt •< Appetts 
Ronald L. Baxter and Shirley Diane 
Baxter, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Utah Department of Transportation, 
Defendant, Third Party 
Plaintiff, and Respondent, 
v. 
Robert Rees Dansie; Marie Grow 
Dansie; Davis County Assessor; 
Davis County Commissioners; Davis 
County Recorder; and Weber County, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING REHEARING 
Case No. 890175-CA 
Appellant's petition for rehearing is hereby denied, 
DATED this of December, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the *# day of December, 1989, a 
ue and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DENIAL OF PETITION 
iR REHEARING was deposited in the United States mail. 
Glen E. Fuller 
Attorney for Appellant 
245 N. Vine Street #608 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Stephen C. Ward 
Assistant Attorney General 
124 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Gerald E. Hess 
Assistant County Attorney 
Davis County Courthouse 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Brent E. Johns 
Assistant Weber County Attorney 
2411 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
DATED this*s2£_ day of December, 1989. 
By yz^Zf^dt fP=r2s/ 
/ Deputy Clerk^/^ 
17-1-3 COUNTIES 
17-1-3. Existing counties adopted. 
The several counties as they are in this chapter named and described are 
the counties of the state until otherwise changed by law. 
History: ILS. 1888 ft CJL1907,1 458*,CX. Crowe Reference. — Existing counties Tec-
1917, I 1282; KB. 1833 ft C. 1943, 18-14. ognized, Utah Const Art H, Sec 1. 
17-1-4. Beaver county — Description. 
Beaver county: Beginning at a point on the summit of the range separating 
the Beaver and Pahvant valleys from Sevier valley east of a point two miles 
south of the south side of Fort Wilden on Cove creek, thence west to the state 
boundary; thence south to the line separating townships 30 and 31 south; 
thence east to the summit of said range; thence northerly along said summit 
to the point of beginning. 
History: ILS. 1888 ft CJL 1807,1 460; CX. 
1917, | 1283; ILS. 1933 4 C. 1843, 18-1-4. 
17-1-5. Box Elder county — Description. 
Box Elder county: Beginning at the intersection of the northern boundary of 
the state and the summit of the range next east of Malad valley, thence west 
to the northwest corner of the state; thence south to the forty-first parallel of 
north latitude; thence east to the western shore of Great Salt Lake; thence 
northeasterly along and to the middle point of, a straight line drawn between 
said point on the lake and a point on the east shore thereof due west of the 
middle of the channel of the Weber river at a point north of the northwest 
corner of Kingston's fort; thence northeasterly along a straight line drawn 
from said middle point of said line to a point on the west line of range 3 west, 
due west from the Hot Springs situated at the point of the mountain north of 
Ogden; thence east to said springs; then northeasterly along the summit of the 
spur range terminating at said springs to, and thence along, the summit of the 
Wasatch mountains, passing around the headwaters of Box Elder and Willow 
creeks, and crossing the Bear river at the middle point of its lower canyon, to 
and thence northerly along, the summit of the range of mountains next east of 
Malad valley to the point of beginning. 
History: ILS, 1888 ft CJL 1807, t 461; CX. 
1817, I 1284; BS. 1833 4 C. 1843, 18-1-6. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Judicial notice of county's territorial ex- travel in said county, it would be impoeable to 
tent verify a complaint in many parts of the county 
The Supreme Court will take judicial notice and file the same on the day it is verified. 
of the territorial extent ofthis county, and that James •. Jensen, 50 Utah 485, 187 P. 827 
by the usual means of transportation and (1817). 
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east along the touth boundarv lin** rf'a^^^L"'™v *AW~ u~/*•*•'• "•«"** 
.ix <26)£the n ^ w T c ^ ^ ^ 
(1) north of range twenty-four (24) east t h e ^ ^ f i ? i ^ town»hjP one 
said section M t y « i (36), t o^^u^wes t^JL' f ? ^ L ? " V* "»• o f 
to the northweaTcorner of t o w £ £ p o n T ^ i I f S L T S T ftf2? 
east; thence south along the westbou^rv i S ? ™ T t*611*-6™ <25> 
range twenty-five (25) W t o S e l ! S k S ^ ! ^ T ^ ^ ff « « * <* 
east along the south boundary ^ ™ ^ n s ^ ^ ? , £ ^ * " " * 
(32), township one (1) smrthif rangj ^ n v ^ T ^ 3 ^ ^ ^ ^ 
corner of section four (4), tmStmm^A^JT^ V"^?*"9* 
east; thence south along t h e ^ S u n d a r y f t J S S S 8 ! ? ? » 
(9), to the west quarter corner of s e c t i ^ i ™ To w ?? four ( 4 ) ""* B1De 
range t w e n t y - f i v e X e a T * e n ^ of 
(9), ten (10), eleven (11), and twelve ( 1 2 ) t o w ^ S l ™ of sections nine 
twenty-five (25) east to the Colorado^  s t a t e £ r S ? P ° i ? f U t h o f *— 
rado ^ate line to the point o f ^ S ^ * * ^ 
History: Governor's Proclamation, No-
•ember 16, 1917; OL. 1917, i 1397; RA 
1833 ft C. 1943,19.14; L» 1943. eh. 18, | l. 
17-1-9. Davis county — Description. 
Davis county: Beginning at a point in the middle of the channel of th* 
Weber river where crossed by the summit line of the WaJatehr^! • ? 
westerly down the middle of said channel to a ooint n * t £ ^ £ ^ , J ? ~ M * 
corner of Kingston's fort; thence west to the ea£ I r e ^ G r e ^ ^ T * 
thence southwesterly along and to the middle DomtrfTj£X?v * 
between said point on thelast shore ^ u S ^ ^ S X S S S f V 
at latitude 41 degrees north; thence southeaster* S ^ a S S ? ? * ^ 
ning between Black Rock on the s o u t h e r n ^ S S d l a k e ^ L ^ S ? * 
point of said line to the base line of the United StateT Ju™>f1 ***!* 
easterly and equidistant between A n t e l o w ^ d a ^ \ h T I ^ ^ f^l 
lake to a point west of the mouth c t £ £ £ £ S t 3 ^ W ^ T * 
1 west; thence east to the mouth of the Jordan S 3 vJ w e s t l ™ e o f range 
the middle of the channel rf toe Jordan rive? £ ^ ™ •** f ™ ? " " * ^ «P 
rods north of Hot Spring m i e t , r S p ^ oflalt L ^ l r t 1 * P ° f a t 1 3 6 
toe ^mmit of toe g r a n g e t e S ^ t ^ H ^ , ^ S S £ £ 
easterly along said last mentioned summit to its mtersectioTSth J S £ 
northerly along, the summit of toe Wasatch r a ^ l X ^ b C u n g * 
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boundary line of the state of Utah; thence west along the Utah-Arizona 
boundary line to the west boundary line of the state of Utah; thence north 
along said w e s t boundary line to the point of beginning. 
History: R.S. 1898 * C.L. 1907, § 484; L. 
1917 ch.34,6 1; CX. 1917, § 1319; R.S. 1933 
\ C. 1*43, 19-1-30. 
17-1-31. Wayne county — Description. 
Wayne county: Beginning at the middle of the channel of the Green river at 
latitude 38 degrees and 30 minutes north, thence west to the line between 
ranges 5 and 6 east; thence north to a point east of the point where the wagon 
road crosses the summit between Marysvale and Monroe; thence west to the 
summit of the range between the Rabbit and Grass valleys; thence southwest-
erly along said summit to the Salt Lake meridian; thence south to the line 
between townships 30 and 31 south; thence east to the middle of the channel 
of the Colorado river; thence northerly up the channels of the Colorado and 
Green rivers to the point of beginning. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 485; CJL 
1917, § 1320; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 19-1-31. 
17-1-32. Weber county — Description. 
Weber county: Beginning at the intersection of the summit of the Wasatch 
range north and east of the Ogden valley and the summit of the range sepa-
rating the Bear Lake valley from the Cache valley, thence westerly to the Hot 
springs near the county road north of Ogden along the summits of the 
Wasatch range and the spur range terminating at said Hot springs; thence 
west to the line between ranges 3 and 4 west; thence southwesterly in a 
straight line to the middle point of a line drawn from a point on the east shore 
of Great Salt Lake west of the middle of the channel of the Weber river north 
of the northwest corner of Kingston's fort to a point on the west shore of said 
lake at latitude 41 degrees north; thence northeasterly along said last de-
scribed line to the east shore of Great Salt Lake; thence east to the middle of 
the channel of the Weber river; thence up the middle of said channel to a point 
where crossed by the summit line of the Wasatch range; thence northeasterly 
along the summit of said range around the headwaters of the Ogden river to 
the point of beginning. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 486; C.L. 
1917, § 1321; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 19-1-32. 
17-1-33. Disputed boundaries — Determination. 
Whenever any dispute or uncertainty shall arise as to any county boundary 
the same may be determined by the county surveyors of the counties inter-
ested, and in case they fail to agree or otherwise fail to establish the bound-
ary, the board of county commissioners of either or both counties interested 
shall engage the services of the state engineer, who with the aforesaid county 
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17-1-33 COUNTIES 
surveyors, or either of them, if but one appears for that purpose, all having 
received due and proper notice, shall proceed forthwith to permanently deter-
mine such boundary line by making the necessary surveys and erecting suit-
able monuments to designate the boundaries, which shall be deemed perma-
nent until superseded by legislative enactment. Nothing in this section shall 
be construed to give the surveyors or state engineer any further authority 
than to erect suitable monuments to designate boundaries as they are now 
established by law 
History: R.S. 1898, § 487; L. 1907, ch. 82, Croas-References. — County surveyor, 
§ 1; C.L. 1907, § 487; CX. 1917, 5 1322; R.S. § 17-23-1 et seq 
1933 & C. 1943, 19-1-33. State engineer, § 73-2-1 et seq 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Authority of Legislature 
Compliance with statute required 
Duty of legislature 
State engineer's authority 
Authority of legislature. 
The legislature has the sole power to define 
and determine the boundary lines between 
counties, and to provide the means or methods 
by which such boundaries, when in dispute, 
may be established and marked upon the 
ground Barton v Sanpete County, 49 Utah 
188, 162 P 611 (1916) 
Legislature, by reason of Const Art XI, Sec 
3, is without authority to establish or locate a 
new or any boundary line between counties 
where a boundary line exists, unless the de-
scription of the boundary line is so indefinite, 
uncertain, or ambiguous that the line cannot 
be definitely determined, or for any other rea-
son the line cannot be located on the ground, in 
attempting to establish the correct line, the 
legislature must determine the line as it was 
intended to be established prior to the enact-
ment of the correcting legislative act, any act 
of the legislature attempting to establish a new 
OT different knfc without regard to the original 
intention is unconstitutional Summit County 
v Rich County, 63 Utah 194,224 P 653 (1924) 
The determination of county boundary lines 
rests with the legislature San Juan County v 
Grand County, 13 Utah 2d 242, 371 P 2d 855 
(1962) 
Where the legislative acts defining the 
boundary are clear and unambiguous, the state 
supreme court will not search for a meaning 
beyond the statutes themselves San Juan 
County v Grand County, 13 Utah 2d 242, 371 
P.2d 855 (1962) 
Compliance with statute required. 
Trial court was correct in dismissing com-
plaint of San Juan County, seeking to enjoin 
Grand County from exercising jurisdiction over 
a disputed area, and a counterclaim filed by 
Grand County, asserting its rights to the dis-
puted area, where there had been no substan-
tial compliance with this section However, m 
so doing, the court should have declared that 
as a matter of law the common boundary of the 
two counties is Parallel 38 degrees 30 minutes 
north latitude San Juan County v Grand 
County, 13 Utah 2d 242, 371 P 2d 855 (1962) 
Duty of Legislature. 
It was duty of Legislature in attempting to 
establish a boundary lme to follow the original 
statutory description as nearly as practicable, 
and, if it found it impracticable to follow it at 
some particular point, then to establish a new 
hne In doing so, however, it was still its duty 
to be guided by what it conceived to be the 
intention of the legislature which attempted to 
establish the original line Summit County v 
Rich County, 57 Utah 553, 195 P 639 (1921) 
State engineer's authority. 
In adopting this section, the Legislature did 
not confer power upon the state engineer to 
unconditionally determine and establish the 
disputed boundary hne between two counties 
The boundary hne which the state engineer 
was authorized to establish, m the language of 
the act, "shall be deemed permanent until su-
perseded by legislative enactment" Accord-
ingly, he could only conditionally or provision-
ally locate or establish a disputed boundary 
hue Barton v Sanpete County, 49 Utah 188, 
162 P 611 (1916) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COORT OP WEBER COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
RONALD L. BAXTER and 
SHIRLEY DIANE BAXTER, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs. 
RIO VISTA OIL, LTD., 
a Utah corporation. 
Involuntary Plaintiff, 
vs 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT REES DANSIE, MARIE GROW 
DANSIE, DAVIS COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS, DAVIS COUNTY 
ASSESSOR, DAVIS COUNTY RECORDER, 
and WEBER COUNTY, a Body Politic 
of the State or Dtah, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 74206 
The question presented in this case is: Where was the 
Weber River in 1866. The boundary between Weber and Davis County 
was established by description in an act of the legislature of 
Utah Territory in 1866. The description used the Bain cnannel of 
Ill-a 
•ge 2 
•moranduin Decision 
ase No. 74206 
he Weber River as the boundary in the area of the subject 
roperty. It i s the contention of the plaintiff that in 1866 the 
eber River was north of the subject property, and the property 
as , therefore, located in Davis County. Plaintiff further 
ontends the river later altered i t s course by sudden avulsive 
ction caused by either man-made or natural conditions, so that 
he subject property lands on the north side of the Weber River. 
Plaintiff re l ies primarily upon three surveys: One in 
855; one in 1877; and a third in 1886. These surveys are ot the 
es t border of Section 25. The notes of these surveys show the 
iver crossing the west boundary of the section at different 
ocations, but primarily north of the subject property. The 
•roblem with this i s that i t does not show where the river was, 
ay, 50 feet east of the border. It becomes even further confus-
ng, for example, both Plaintiff 's Exhibit 7 and Derendant's 
ixhibit 7 are plat maps and show the river somewhat north. 
iowever, when you take Defendant's Exhibit 8, which i s Section 26 
•ordering 25, the locations of the river are far off, and the 
>lat map in 26 shows the river crossing the border far south ot 
rhat the plat map in Plaintif f 's and Defendant's Exhibit 7 
(hows. Admittedly, these plat maps are just that, and are 
m da ted, but they do show the confusion in regard to the actual 
location ot the Weber River. 
I l l -b 
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tn. encin.ers called „ « t n e | | M v M n M k M ^ flireet 
,u,.«on! -en yo„ tea us wh.re the „,ber Riv<r ^ 
It appears that in about 1891 •.,.. . 
1B94, the surveyor of Davis 
County and a deputy surveyor in Web.r r«„-» 
/»« in weber County surveyed the river 
Their survey shows the river to be. far .11 < .. ^  
oe
'
 for
 « " intents and purposes, 
where it is today. This survey was don, »„der a statute
 ttat 
.tates whenever any dispute or
 aiiS£imm . a m r l„ „ ^ 
county boundary, the « .
 M y * ^ ^ ^ ^ 
surveyors or the counties interested. m i . appear,
 te be mit 
the 1894 survey between the two county surveyors was.
 M a i n t i f f 
contends that surveyors can only erect »o„u„e„ts. and that thev 
cannot desionat, or aSree upon the boundaries. „o evidence that 
they did anythino other than survey in order to clarify the 
uncertainty.
 As £oc « , „0„-ereetion e£ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
evidence indicates »on»ents are not generally erected al0„g a 
river, because a river is generally a .onuaent. 
I_hoid,th.t the P ^ ^ ^ ^ o x j h ^ ^ d e n c e ^ o w s that 
- V3* l^tion.cf^e.river.jn,^ c ^ ^
 B,.„J ~; 
.ppe-r. that the river, m .
 tt. pto,.tbi.i bi, ,otill.. vent 
wherever it wanted to. The 1855. »7i
 mnA ,.* 
*«:>:>, 71, and '86 surveys of the 
~ t section line indict. priaarUy
 tt.t tt, „„„ of ^ 
- . subject to ch.no.. „,„.
 is ne evid,ne? u ^ ^ ^ 
Page 4 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 74206 
river changed i t . course by . sudden,
 M M y t ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
l . . v , property north of the river i„ D.vi . County. i
 f a r t h e r 
hold t h . t there w.s d e f i n i t e l y ^ _uncett.inty as to the i e e a t i e n 
of the river, which caused an uncertainty as
 t 0 " ^ T c e ^ 
boundary, and .pursuant, to this s t .* , te ,_j*is_ . ujKer Uinty
 M y b e 
d.termined^y_county, purveyors « n d . _ t h » _ s ! ^ d o n e _ i L i e 9 4 , , n d 
that that survey established the boundary between the counties 
ttat survey was just t h . t , a survey of the location of the river, 
and there i s certainly no evioence to i „ a i C a t . th.t the aurveyors 
made any changes in the river, or did anyth<n, other t h r u s t 
•urvey the river bv »etes and bounds. The 18)4 survey se t~^e 
river definitely. There being no prior surveys of the r i . . . 
I t s e l f , to place the_river in a location other * „ . . >K. ,".1. 
survey i s -lust specnlannr, 
I , therefore, hold that the boundary between Davis and 
Keber Counties being the nam channel of the Weber River i s as 
the 1894 survey place the river, which description Us i cwly 
coincides with the present location of the Weber River. 
The subject property i s and has been in Weber County. 
The s a l . by Davis County was invalid .nd of no effect .h . t . o -
. v . r . Plaintiff i s , therefore, not entit ieo to have the t» t l . ot 
the real property quieted as against defendants. 
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Detendant to prepare findings, conclusions and judgment 
in accordance herewith. 
DATED this J^ day of September, 1986. 
ONXLD 0. HYDE, R  
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this S day of September, 
1986, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Decision was served upon the following: 
Stephen C. Ward 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Dtah Department 
of Transportation 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Dtah 84114 
Glen E. Fuller 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
245 North Vine Street #608 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Gerald E. Bess 
Assistant Davis County Attorney 
Attorney for Davis County 
County Courthouse 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Brent E. Johns 
Assistant Weber County Attorney 
Attorney for Weber County 
7th floor, Municipal Building 
Ogden, Dtah 84401 

